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Ruling
SKYLER WELLS VS MAURICE FIROUZ, D.D.S., INC., ET AL.
Aug 21, 2024 |6/18/2022 |24SMCV02107
Case Number: 24SMCV02107 Hearing Date: August 21, 2024 Dept: I The motion to strike is moot due to the filing of the First Amended Complaint, and it has been withdrawn. There will be no hearing on it today. The motion to declare plaintiff a vexatious litigant is still pending. The motion is DENIED. Pursuant to the statute, a plaintiff can be declared vexatious if, over the last seven years, the plaintiff, while self-represented, has maintained five or more actions that have been resolved against the plaintiff or were pending for over two years without justification. Plaintiff contends that such has not been shown. A few things. Whether a voluntary dismissal counts as one of the five depends. For example, parties often reach a settlement that results in a dismissalusually with prejudice but not always. A favorable (to plaintiff) settlement is hardly what the Legislature had in mind for a vexatious litigant. Further, while there have been some cases that were pending for over two years, the key to that statute is that they were pending for that period without justification. Right now, by the time a case gets to trial in this department it will almost certainly have been pending for over two years. That is in part a result of regular litigation and in part a result of the courts crowded docket. What the defense needs to show is that the dismissals of the cases were such that there was little or no relief to the plaintiff in return for the dismissal. A voluntary dismissal in the teeth of a judgment of dismissal would count. A dismissal by way of settlement might not. If the settlement was nominal (like a cost waiver), then it might still count. But the court has no way of knowing and it is up to the defense to so establish. As to cases pending for over two years, it is up to the defense to show that there was no justification. That might occur, perhaps, by way of a docket showing demonstrating that the complaint was never served, or that it was served but no one sought to bring it to trial, or that a trial date was set but continued on plaintiffs request without sufficient cause. There are any number of ways it can be shown. But this court will not assume that any case pending for more than two years has been unjustifiably delayed by the plaintiff. In short, defendant has failed to meet his burden. The motion is therefore DENIED.
Ruling
MATLYNN ROZELL GILES VS 7-ELEVEN, INC., ET AL.
Aug 20, 2024 |24SMCV00326
Case Number: 24SMCV00326 Hearing Date: August 20, 2024 Dept: 205 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles West District Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 MATLYNN ROZELL GILES, Plaintiff, v. 7-ELEVEN, INC., et al., Defendants. Case No.: 24SMCV00326 Hearing Date: August 20, 2024 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA SERVED ON COGNET REHAB SOLUTIONS This hearing is on Plaintiff Matlynn Giles motion to quash a subpoena for production of Plaintiffs medical, billing and radiology records, served on Cognet Rehab Solutions by Defendant 7-Eleven Inc. This Departments rules require that before filing such a discovery motion, the parties engage in an informal discovery conference (IDC). No IDC was held. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs motion to quash without prejudice. DATED: August 20, 2024 ___________________________ Edward B. Moreton, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court
Ruling
KAVEH FASIH VS THE PURPLE MIXER, INC.
Aug 20, 2024 |24STCV08425
Case Number: 24STCV08425 Hearing Date: August 20, 2024 Dept: 58 Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki Department 58 Hearing Date: August 20, 2024 Case Name: Kaveh Fasih v. The Purple Mixer, Inc. Case No.: 24STCV08425 Motion: Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Moving Party: Defendant, The Purple Mixer, Inc. dba Miss Jones Baking Co. Opposing Party: Plaintiff, Kaveh Fasih Tentative Ruling: The motion is granted. This is a slack fill claim. Plaintiff Kaveh Fasih (Plaintiff) sued defendant The Purple Mixer, Inc. dba Miss Jones Baking Co. (Defendant) on April 4, 2024, asserting one cause of action for fraud and another for violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), Civil Code section 1750 et seq. Plaintiff alleges Defendant sells muffin mix in opaque packaging that obscures its volume; the mix only fills about 30% of its container. By obscuring the actual volume of what consumers are purchasing, Plaintiff alleges Defendant dupes consumers into paying extra for empty space. (FAC, ¶¶ 1, 3.) On July 10, 2024, Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings. As to both causes of action, Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to state a claim and lacks standing to seek injunctive relief. As to Plaintiffs CLRA claim only, Defendant also argues the claim is preempted by federal law. Plaintiff filed his opposition on August 7, 2024. On August 13, 2024, Defendant replied. Request for Judicial Notice Defendant requests judicial notice of its own packaging. The request is granted. Plaintiff included a photo of the packaging in the Complaint. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings when the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438(b)(1) and (c)(1)(B)(ii).) A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. Presentation of extrinsic evidence is & not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999, citations omitted.) The standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer: that under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216.) The court must accept as true all material facts properly pleaded, but does not consider conclusions of law or fact, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or facts that are judicially noticed. (Stevenson Real Estate Services, Inc. v. CB Richard Ellis Real Estate Services, Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1219-1220, citing Shea Homes Limited Partnership v. County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254.) First Cause of Action for Fraud The elements of fraud are (1) a misrepresentation, (2) with knowledge of falsity, (3) intent for plaintiff to rely on the misrepresentation, (4) plaintiffs reasonable reliance, and (5) damage. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) Under California law, fraud must be pled with particularity; [t]he particularity demands that a plaintiff plead facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered. (Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469.) Fraud allegations need not be liberally construed, general pleading of the legal conclusion of fraud is insufficient, and every element of the cause of action for fraud must be alleged fully, factually and specifically. (Wilhelm v. Pray, Price, Williams & Russell (1986) 186 Cal. App. 3d 1324, 1331; see also Quelimane Co., Inc. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal. 4th 26, 47) Plaintiff seeks to meet these elements at paragraph 34 of the complaint. But these are mostly simply conclusions. Plaintiff asserts that the false representation was that the package was full of product. Plaintiff does not claim that the weight stated on the package is inaccurate. The package as depicted in the complaint is clearly pliable, and can be picked up by the consumer who can feel the amount of the contents within the package. This is not a hard sided box in which the weight and volume of the product cannot be seen or felt. And, there is no statement on the package asserting anything about the package being full. A reasonable consumer can read the package setting forth the weight and can pick up and handle the package before purchasing it. Because Plaintiff does not contend that the net weight specified on the package is inaccurate, or that the package lacks pliability, the Court concludes that the Complaint fails to establish a misrepresentation. (Ebner v. Fresh, Inc. (9th Cir. 2016) 838 F.3d 958, 965 [reasonable consumer would not be misled when correct weight included on product].) Plaintiff must also plead and prove that he actually relied upon the asserted misrepresentation. (Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 908, 917.) Plaintiff does not plead reliance and, because he is a serial tester, he cannot truthfully claim that he purchased the product relying on whatever he regards as the representations of the packaging. (Buckland v. Threshold Enterprises, Ltd. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 798, 808-809 [rejecting claim of reliance under fraud and CLRA theories].) The motion to strike the first cause of action is granted. Second Cause of Action for Violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act The CLRA prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in transactions involving the sale of goods or services to any consumer. (Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1249.) Per the CLRAs private cause of action, [a]ny consumer who suffers any damage as a result of the use or employment by any person a method, act or practice declared to be unlawful by [Civil Code section 1770] may bring an action against that person[.] (Civ. Code, § 1780(a).) The elements for a CLRA claim, derived from sections 1770 and 1780, are: (1) that the plaintiff is a consumer, (2) that the defendant engaged in an unlawful practice, and that the practice (3) resulted in (4) damage to the plaintiff. (See ibid.; cf. also Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1246 [basic elements of wrongdoing, causation, and harm as applied to consumer protection claim (Song Beverly Act)].) As discussed above, Plaintiff has not pleaded reliance. (Princes Cruise Lines, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2009) 179 CalApp.4th 36, 46 [reliance is required for CLRA actions].) Moreover, the Complaint does not claim that the package states a net weight different from what the package contains or that the packaging precludes a container by holding the pliable package, ascertain the weight and volume of the product. The Court grants the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the CLRA claim. Conclusion The Court grants the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to both causes of action. The Court grants leave to file and serve an amended complaint on or before September 13, 2024.
Ruling
IAN SEBASTIAN VILLEGAS VS CANDLEWOOD APARTMENTS, ET AL.
Aug 19, 2024 |Renee C. Reyna |20STCV46010
Case Number: 20STCV46010 Hearing Date: August 19, 2024 Dept: 29 Villegas v. Candlewood Apartments 20STCV46010 Petition for Approval of Minors Compromise as to Claimant Ian Villegas (Age 9). Tentative: The Court excuses the personal appearance of the claimant and the guardian ad litem. Counsel may appear by telephone or video conference call. The Court has reviewed the petition for Claimant Ian Villegas filed on July 11, 2024. There are two issues that the Court has identified that must be addressed before the Court can approve the petition. First, on the petition, no Final Medi-Cal Lien Letter has been attached as required by no. 12b(4)(c). Second, there is a small error on the proposed order: the amount to be reimbursed to Marisa Perry, PPS, MA, LEP is incorrectly listed at $4,740 instead of $4,750. The Petition to Approve the Minor Compromise of Ian Villegas is CONTINUED to allow Petitioner to address these issues. The Court CONTINUED the hearing on the petition from 08/19/2024 to __/__/2024 at 01:30 PM in DEPT. 29 at SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE. Moving party to give notice.
Ruling
Heather Barlin vs Dawn Roach
Aug 19, 2024 |24CV00098
24CV00098BARLIN v. ROACH DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT The demurrer to the ninth cause of action is sustained with leave to amend. Plaintiff shallfile any amended complaint related to the ninth cause of action no later than 14 days from thehearing. “While [Penal Code §496(a)] covers a spectrum of impermissible activity relating tostolen property, the elements required to show a violation of section 496(a) are simply that (i)property was stolen or obtained in a manner constituting theft, (ii) the defendant knew theproperty was so stolen or obtained, and (iii) the defendant received or had possession of thestolen property.” (Switzer v. Wood (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 116, 126, quoting Lacagnina v.Comprehend Systems, Inc. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 955, 970 [elements of Penal Code §496offense stated].) “A violation of section 496(a) may, by its own terms, relate to property that hasbeen ‘stolen’ or ‘that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion.’” (Id.,quoting Pen. Code §496(a).) “[N]ot all commercial or consumer disputes alleging that a defendant obtained money orproperty through fraud, misrepresentation, or breach of a contractual promise will amount to atheft.” (Siry Investment, L.P. v. Farhondehpour (2022) 13 Cal.5th 333, 361.) “To prove theft, aplaintiff must establish criminal intent on the part of the defendant beyond ‘mere proof ofnonperformance or actual falsity.’” (Id. at 361-362.) “[I]n cases of obtaining property by falsepretenses, it must be proved that any misrepresentations of fact alleged […] were madeknowingly and with intent to deceive.” (People v. Ashley (1954) 42 Cal.2d 246, 264.) Plaintiff alleges: • FAC ¶ 7, “Upon information and belief, Roach rented the Premises to plaintiff with knowledge that her rental of the unpermitted dwelling was illegal.” • FAC ¶ 8, “Plaintiff was not aware that the Premises was an illegal rental unit until late October, 2023. Upon entering possession in 2021, plaintiff relied on Roach’s written statements in the rental contract and other representations that the Page 5 of 6 Premises was a legal dwelling unit. Roach deceived plaintiff by failing to inform her that the Premises was an unpermitted dwelling unit.” • FAC ¶¶ 53-55, “By the acts and omissions described above, Roach deceived plaintiff by intentionally misrepresenting the legality, safety and habitability code compliance of the Premises by false representation, concealment, and nondisclosure. Roach did so with knowledge that such representations were false. Roach did so with intent to induce reliance on her false statements and omissions of truth.” • FAC ¶¶ 63-65, “ROACH knowingly made false statements to plaintiff, fraudulently inducing her to rent the Premises. ROACH knowingly concealed the fact that the Premises was not a legal and habitable residence. ROACH knowingly concealed the fact that the Premises did not conform the contract agreement between the parties.” Such allegations amount to misrepresentation (her seventh cause of action) but fail tosatisfy criminal intent. Plaintiff has alleged conclusory statements – not facts – that defendantobtained rental payments with an intent to deceive. Without more facts, plaintiff’s allegationsamount to misrepresentation but not criminal intent to receive or withhold stolen property.Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal orderincorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating thetentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, inaccordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if theprevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative issimply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition ofsanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 6 of 6
Ruling
MARIA DITICO VS. MARCOS AUGUSTO PRONIN ET AL
Aug 20, 2024 |CGC23607010
Matter on the Discovery Calendar for Tuesday, Aug-20-2024, Line 3, PLAINTIFF MARIA DITICO'S Motion To Quash Or Modify Defendants Subpoena For Employment Records. Continued to September 6, 2024 on the court's motion. No JPT available. (D525)
Ruling
34-2022-00325974-CU-PO-GDS
Aug 20, 2024 |Unlimited Civil (Other Personal Injury/Propert...) |34-2022-00325974-CU-PO-GDS
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 34-2022-00325974-CU-PO-GDS: Thomas M Seely vs. Lifetime Fitness 08/21/2024 Hearing on Motion to Strike Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 54Tentative RulingTENTATIVE RULINGDefendants Lifetime Fitness, Inc. dba Lifetime Fitness, Leonard Green & Partners, LP, TPGCapital Management, LP, Tarrant capital, LP, LLC, LCN-LNK Folsome (Multi), LLC (collectively“Defendants”) motion to strike portions of Plaintiff Thomas Seeley’s First Amended Complaint isruled upon as follow.Defendants move to strike paragraphs and language from Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaintas follows: 1. Paragraph 6, page 3, line 19 to page 4, line 17, “PLAINTIFF also alleges that DEFENDANTS’ activities violated California law and statutes and that DEFENDANTS, and each of them, engaged in conduct and failed to act in such a fashion such that their acts and omissions: Showed a want of even scant care; Constituted an extreme departure from what reasonably careful persons would do in the same situation to prevent harm to others; Constituted an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct applicable to inspections, maintenance and cleaning of a health club shower facility, including the FLOOR; Constituted an extreme departure from conditions that one would expect in a health club shower facility, including the FLOOR; Constituted an extreme departure from safety standards applicable to inspections, maintenance and cleaning of a health club shower facility, including the FLOOR; Constituted an extreme departure from safety precautions applicable to inspections, maintenance and cleaning of a health club shower facility, including the FLOOR; Constituted an extreme departure from standard practice applicable to inspections, maintenance and cleaning of a health club shower facility, including the FLOOR; Constituted an extreme departure from standard of care applicable to inspections, maintenance and cleaning of a health club shower facility, including the FLOOR and; Constituted an extreme departure from industry standards applicable to inspections, maintenance and cleaning of a health club shower facility, including the FLOOR. 2. Paragraph 7, page 4, line 19, to page 5, line 8, “In addition, DEFENDANTS: Took no measures and failed to use even scant care to mitigate the inherent risks associated with the health club shower facility at the Subject Property, including the FLOOR; .... Failed to investigate other health club member complaints about the slippery nature and condition of the FLOOR, pursuant to DEFENDANTS’ policies, procedures and/or protocols and thereby clearly demonstrated a want of scant care to mitigate the inherent risk associated with its showers and the FLOOR, including the limitation, the inherent risk of slipping and falling and; Actively concealed the dangers of the showers in the health club Page 1 of 4 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 34-2022-00325974-CU-PO-GDS: Thomas M Seely vs. Lifetime Fitness 08/21/2024 Hearing on Motion to Strike Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 54 shower facility, including the FLOOR.” 3. Paragraph 8, “These above referenced acts and omissions of DEFENDANTS showed a blatant disregard for the safety of others, including without limitation, PLAINTIFF.” 4. Paragraph 9, “PLAINTIFF alleges that the conduct by DEFENDANTS, and each of them, as alleged herein arises to the level of and constitutes gross negligence so as to vitiate any alleged waiver and/or release signed by PLAINTIFF.”(Notice of Motion & Motion to Strike, 2:3 – 3:14.)Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint contains a single cause of action for negligence, with claimsof gross negligence contained therein. Plaintiff alleges that he was injured after slipping in theshower area of the locker room at a fitness facility operated by Defendants.Defendants argue that the allegations pertaining to gross negligence is false or improper matter,and is not drawn in conformity with the laws of California, and therefore should be stricken. Cal.Code Civ. Proc. §435(b)(1). (Memo. Of Ps & As, 1:12-14.)A motion to strike challenges portions of a complaint that are substantively defective on the faceof the complaint. (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682-1683; see alsoCode Civ. Proc. § 437.) The Court does not consider extrinsic evidence in considering themotion. More specifically, a motion to strike should be granted to remove “any irrelevant, false,or improper matter inserted in any pleading,” or where the pleadings are drawn in violation of alaw, rule, or court order. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436.) Motion to strike are disfavored. Courtsconsidering such motions must presume the allegations contained therein are true and mustconsider those allegations in context. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253,1255.) The use of the motion to strike should be cautious and sparing; it should not be aprocedural “line item veto” for the civil defendant. (PH II, Inc., 33 Cal.App.4th at 1683.) Where asubstantive defect is clear from the face of a complaint, such as a purporting claim of right whichis legally invalid, that portion of the cause of action may be attacked through a motion to strike.(Id. at 1682-1683.)Defendants admit in their papers that, “Falsity must appear from the face or the pleadings orfrom matters judicially noticed. Garcia v Sterling (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 17, 21.” (Memo. Of Ps& As, 1:22-23.) But Defendants do not point to any support for the assertion that Plaintiff’sallegations of gross negligence are false based on the face of the complaint, or based on anyjudicially noticed fact. The Court does not find this argument convincing.However, Defendants also argue that the allegations referring to gross negligence should bestricken because they are merely conclusory and Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support anallegation of gross negligence.In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the First Amended Complaint alleges facts that support anallegation of gross negligence, including allegations of failures to perform acts that would havelimited risks of falls, but, also, that Defendants “[a]ctively concealed the dangers of the showers Page 2 of 4 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 34-2022-00325974-CU-PO-GDS: Thomas M Seely vs. Lifetime Fitness 08/21/2024 Hearing on Motion to Strike Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 54in the health club shower facility, including the FLOOR.” (First Amended Complaint. ¶ 7.)Defendants rely on Anderson v. Fitness Internat., LLC, 4 Cal. App. 5th 867, 873, which alsoinvolves a plaintiff alleging gross negligence against a fitness center after sustaining injuriesfrom falling in shower facilities, finding against Plaintiff. Plaintiff distinguishes the cases on thebasis that it was a ruling governing a motion for summary judgment, but as Defendants point outon reply, the ruling includes the reasoning for the court’s earlier granting of a motion to strikeallegations regarding gross negligence.The Court concludes that Anderson is analogous to this case. In Anderson, as in this case, theplaintiff in his first amended complaint alleged a cause of action that included general and grossnegligence allegations. The defendant in Anderson moved to strike the allegations of grossnegligence on the basis that Plaintiff had not plead facts to support a showing of grossnegligence. The plaintiff had alleged that he had previously complained about falling in theshower, putting the defendant on notice, but the court found that this was not sufficient. TheAnderson court explained:“The trial court stated that Anderson has not alleged any facts to show that L.A. Fitness was puton notice of the dangerous conditions in the men's shower room. It stated, “you don't knowwhether those complaints came under the nose of someone with authority to give yousomething about them and that person tossed them in the air with reckless abandonment, orwhether a secretary accidentally threw away all of the complaints so they never came to theattention of anybody who was in a position to do anything about it. Until you have those facts,you're just pleading a conclusion of gross negligence.” (Id.)Here, while the Court agrees with Plaintiff that concealing the danger could constitute grossnegligence, it would depend on the actual factual circ*mstances, which are not plead in the FirstAmended Complaint.Defendants’ motion to strike is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND the complaint to addfactual allegations to support a claim of gross negligence.Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint not later than September 3, 2024. If Plaintiff failsto file and serve a second amended complaint by that date, Defendants shall answer the firstamended complaint by September 18, 2024.This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (CodeCiv. Proc. § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)NOTICE:Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on thiscalendar must comply with the following procedure: Page 3 of 4 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 34-2022-00325974-CU-PO-GDS: Thomas M Seely vs. Lifetime Fitness 08/21/2024 Hearing on Motion to Strike Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 54To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law andMotion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before thehearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requestingparty shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oralargument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument;and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and thatopposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If norequest for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely eithertelephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with noticeto the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Althoughremote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely fornon-evidentiary civil hearings. The Department 53/54 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept53.54 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear onZoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NOCOURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporterservices at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules ofCourt, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy forOfficial Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website athttps://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court-Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved OfficialReporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.pdf.A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to besigned by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using areporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiverand requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party witha Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearingor at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerkwill forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided. Page 4 of 4
Ruling
Aug 19, 2024 |23CV-0202671
FORRESTER VS. M&M MEYERS ENTERPRISES, INC, ET AL.Case Number: 23CV-0202671This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of default judgment. The Court notes thatPlaintiff attempted to file a Request for Court Judgement. It was rejected by the Clerk because theDoe Defendants have not yet been dismissed. This matter is continued to Monday, September16, 2024, at 9:00 a.m. in Department 64 for review regarding status of default judgment. Noappearance is necessary on today’s calendar.
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